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Abstract.    
A field of primate linguistics is gradually emerging. It combines general questions and tools 
from theoretical linguistics with rich data gathered in experimental primatology. Analyses of 
several monkey systems have uncovered very simple morphological and syntactic rules, and 
they have led to the development of  a primate semantics which asks new questions about the 
division of semantic labor between the literal meaning  of monkey calls, additional 
mechanisms of pragmatic enrichment, and the environmental context. We show that 
comparative studies across species may validate this program, and may in some cases help 
reconstruct the evolution of monkey communication over millions of years.  
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The importance of monkey calls 
Although numerous species use vocalizations to transmit information to conspecifics, a great 
deal of research has been specifically devoted to studying primate calls. The original hope 
was that these studies might provide clues about the evolution of human language 
([1][2][3][4]). Connections to human language remain elusive, but a rich body of field 
experiments combined with new theoretical work has made it possible for a field of 'primate 
linguistics' to start emerging [5], with new insights into the structure and especially meaning 
of monkey calls. (Ape calls are currently less well understood.)  Extant results about monkey 
call syntax (see Glossary)(i.e. rules by which monkey calls are put together) are modest, but 
new findings about their semantics (i.e. rules by which monkey calls are interpreted) have 
yielded precise hypotheses about what individual calls mean and how these meanings can be 
combined in sequences. In addition, there are striking similarities among the calls of monkey 
species that diverged millions of years ago. This makes it possible to use information about 
the evolutionary history of monkeys (obtained by DNA methods) to reconstruct the history of 
some calls over millions of years – which might pave the way for an evolutionary primate 
linguistics.  
The formal approach 
How should monkey calls be studied? We argue that a key idea should be borrowed from 
contemporary linguistics: monkey call sequences should be studied as formal languages with 
syntactic rules (pertaining to their form) and semantic rules (pertaining to their meaning). 
From the standpoint of formal language theory, it takes extraordinarily little for something to 
count as a 'language': any set of strings will do. But treating an object as a formal language 
forces one to make precise predictions about the form, use and structure of expressions. From 
this methodological (and terminological) stance, it does not follow that the specific rules one 
will uncover are similar to those of human language – for the most part, they are not. On the 
other hand, this methodology makes it possible to state and test precise hypotheses about the 
grammar of monkey communication. 
Human languages as formal languages: syntax, semantics and pragmatics 
In linguistics, formal syntax sought to specify rules that predict which strings are well-formed 
([6][7]; syntax in the narrow sense is concerned with the way in which words are combined, 
but in a broad sense it should include questions of phonology and morphology, which 
pertain to the organization of sounds and words). For its part, formal semantics ([8][9][10]) 
sought to specify rules that predict in which situations a syntactically well-formed message is 
true. In both fields, the formal approach was integrated into a cognitive one – almost from the 
beginning in syntax ([7]), and in later developments in semantics ([11][12]). For our 
purposes, what matters is the program of analyzing natural communication systems as formal 
languages rather than the specific assumptions made by one framework or another, especially 
since the formal properties of monkey calls are very different from those of human language 
(see [13] and [14] for surveys of diverse formal frameworks for syntax and semantics 
respectively). 
 A key insight of contemporary studies of meaning is that the information conveyed by 
a sentence is not just due to its semantics, i.e. meaning as it is linguistically encoded, but also 
to pragmatic inferences, which are drawn by reasoning on the speaker's motives for uttering 
one sentence rather than another (e.g. [15]).  
 A textbook example involves the information conveyed by the disjunction S or S'. 
One will quickly realize that in some cases or appears to be exclusive (S or S' is true just in 
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case exactly one of S and S' is true), as in the sentence I will invite Ann or Mary, which 
usually gives rise to the inference that I will invite Ann or Mary, but not both. In other cases, 
by contrast, or appears to be inclusive (S or S' is true just in case at least one of S and S' is 
true). This is the case in the sentence I doubt that I'll invite Ann or Mary, which is understood 
as: I doubt that I'll invite [Ann or Mary or both].  
 Rather than positing an ambiguity, contemporary linguistics has devised a better 
theory: the meaning of or is inclusive, but a sentence with or automatically evokes the 
corresponding sentence with and. As a result, if the speaker is maximally informative, and 
utters a sentence with or which is less informative than its competitor with and, one can infer 
that the latter couldn't be uttered – typically because it was false. In a simple sentence such as 
I will invite Ann or Mary, or will overall convey an exclusive meaning. But it will retain its 
bare inclusive meaning in I doubt that I'll invite Ann or Mary because, due to the negative 
expression doubt, the sentence with and is now less informative than that with or ([16][5]).  
 The key to this analysis is the Informativity Principle, which can be stated as 
follows: 
 
If the speaker uttered a sentence S which evokes ('competes with') a sentence S', if S' is more 
informative than S,  infer that S' is false S (for if S' were true the speaker should have uttered 
it). 
 
In linguistics, the Informativity Principle is usually taken to follow from humans' ability to 
communicate cooperatively and to reconstruct the intentions of language users. But as we 
will see shortly, this principle doesn't require such mind-reading abilities, as it is solely based 
on a relation of competition among possible messages, and differences of informativity 
among some of them. Although it takes young children some time to correctly apply the 
Informativity Principle, this is primarily thought to be due to the difficulty of computing 
which sentences compete with a given sentence ([12][17]). 
 
Monkey call sequences as formal languages 
In primatology, observations and field experiments have established two points (e.g. [1][5]). 
(i) The species under study arrange discrete calls in constrained ways.  
(ii) Some calls are naturally triggered by some situations but not others.  Furthermore, field 
experiments establish that the monkeys themselves know this correlation and thus derive 
information from the calls they hear. 
 The first point (discrete calls are arranged in constrained ways) establishes that one 
can study the syntax of monkey calls, i.e. the rules by which calls are combined (syntax in a 
narrow sense) and composed (of sounds and possibly morphemes – phonology and 
morphology). This falls within a more general program of animal syntax, which has led to the 
common claim ([18][19][20]) that many animal systems can be analyzed as a sub-class of so-
called finite-state languages, a simple model which was briefly considered for human 
language but decidedly refuted in the 1950's ([5]).  Most results in primate syntax are thought 
to be compatible with this general claim (but see [21]).  Salient results, compatible with the 
finite-state language claim, are worth mentioning. 
 First, there are cases of call-internal (and thus morphological) structure:  in 
Campbell's monkeys, the suffix -oo can be added to two roots, krak and hok ([22][23]). In 
Diana monkeys, the A call can be used alone, but it also serves to form the complex calls LA, 
HA, and RA, which are targeted as units by the operation of repetition, thus yielding LA LA 
LA LA ([5][24][25]).   
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 Second, there are simple rules of call sequencing (syntax in the narrow sense) in 
various species  (see [5] for an overview). Thus in Campbell's monkeys, the call boom 
usually appears as a pair at the very beginning of a sequence. Black-and-white Colobus 
monkey calls include snorts and roars, which may appear singly or be combined; but in the 
latter case, a single snort is followed by a series of roars, and the opposite pattern is not 
found. It is an open question whether constraints on production (or perception) could explain 
these patterns. And in several cases, what initially appeared as a complex syntax was re-
analyzed in a deflationary fashion when call meaning was studied, as we will see below in the 
case of Titi calls. 
 The second point mentioned above (monkey calls convey information) naturally leads 
to the project of a semantic analysis of calls.  But if the notion of an animal syntax might be 
uncontroversial, talk of a "primate semantics" is probably more surprising. First, we wrote 
above that semantics is concerned with the conditions under which a well-formed message is 
true. But is it appropriate to say that monkey call sequences are "true" or "false" in certain 
situations? The issue is terminological: observational and experimental data clearly argue for 
a bipartition of calls among "appropriate" vs. "inappropriate" ones in a given situation; under 
any name, this means that these calls have a semantics – which is unsurprising since they 
clearly convey information. Second, can one postulate the existence of a meaning when there 
is no evidence of an intention to mean something? Here there is a discrepancy between the 
pre-theoretical notion of meaning, which involves intentionality, and the technical notion 
used in linguistics, which assimilates the meaning of an expression to the bi-partition it 
establishes among situations in which it is true vs. false. It is this  lean notion of meaning that 
we employ below ([5]; see [26] for a different view).  
 While this notion of meaning is the one that comes out of formal linguistics, within 
primatology there has been much recent debate about the existence in primates of so-called 
"functionally referential" signals (the adverb "functionally" was included to avoid 
commitments about the psychological underpinnings of such signals).  First, functionally 
referential signals  are supposed to be context-specific, in the sense that they are triggered by 
some stimuli but not others (let us call this "Context specificity"). The intuition is that these 
specific triggers correspond (for the senders) to the reference of the signals. In addition, 
functionally referential signals must elicit responses even in the absence of these stimuli 
([27][29][30]) (let us call this "Stimulus independence"). This is essential to show that 
receivers interpret the signal itself, rather the stimuli it may be associated with:   even in the 
absence of an eagle, a monkey eagle alarm call should trigger an eagle-appropriate reaction in 
conspecifics. It is also often posited ([27]) that the aspect of the context that triggers the 
signal should be external to the caller (let us call this "Externality requirement").  The 
intuition is that reference should be reference to an external reality. Finally, functional 
reference is often associated with the idea that the signal should have a noun-like denotation, 
pertaining for instance to predator classes (eagles, leopards, etc.), but not, say, to something 
less concrete such as response urgency (let us call this the "Nominal requirement").   
 From the present perspective, Stimulus independence is indeed relevant to establish 
that the signal conveys information, but Context specificity, the Externality requirement and 
the Nominal requirement are not entailed by a semantic approach. As will be seen below, we 
posit several general, non-context specific calls, against Context specificity; and the 
meanings we posit almost never pertain directly to predator classes, against the Nominal 
requirement.  Finally, against the Externality requirement, nothing in our approach precludes 
emotional meanings that pertain to the state of the mind of the caller rather than to an external 
event (such emotional meanings certainly exist in human language, where so-called 
"expressives" have been the object of detailed study – see [28]  for discussion). 
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 On the other hand, at this point our discussion says nothing of the existence of a 
monkey pragmatics, as the very notion of a pragmatics might presuppose cognitive abilities 
that go beyond the monkeys' capacities; but we will see below that there might be evidence 
for a monkey proto-pragmatics. 
Semantic questions 
What is the meaning of individual calls? 
Turning to substantive semantic questions, we introduce two theoretical problems raised by 
three case studies.  First, what is the meaning of individual calls? A rich example is afforded 
by Campbell's monkeys of the Tai Forest (Figure 1a). Male adults have non-predation-related 
call, boom. And they use a call krak to raise leopard alerts, and hok for raptor alerts. But as 
mentioned, they also have suffixed calls: krak-oo is used for unspecific alerts, and hok-oo for 
non-ground disturbances. The challenge is to assign meanings to boom, krak, hok, and -oo.  
 Further complexity is added by Campbell's call use on Tiwai Island, where leopards 
haven't been seen for decades: the Tai calls are used, but krak raises unspecific alerts (as does 
krak-oo), rather than leopard alerts. Should we conclude that meaning is subject to  a kind of 
dialectal variation – as it is for pants in American English (meaning "trousers") vs. British 
English (meaning "underpants")?   
How are the meanings of individual calls combined? 
Once one understands what meaning individual calls have, it remains to ask how these 
meanings can be combined. Semanticists say that an expression is compositional if its 
meaning is derived from that of its parts. Interestingly, several monkey cases challenge 
compositionality ([31][5]). 
 In Putty-nosed monkeys (Figure 1b), which have their own non-predation-related 
booms,  pyows alone are used for unspecific alerts, while hacks alone are associated with 
raptors (or possibly high arousal). But sequences containing a few pyows followed by a few 
hacks trigger group movement, rather than predator-appropriate reactions. Is the meaning of 
these pyow-hack sequences  derived from the meaning of their parts, or should they be treated 
as a non-compositional idiom, such as kick the bucket (which means die and involves no 
kicking and no bucket)? 
 A radical compositionality problem arises in Titi monkeys (Figure 1c). With two calls 
(A and B) re-arranged in various ways, their sequences encode information about both 
predator type (cat, raptor) and predator location (on the ground, in the canopy). Do these 
sequences have a complex syntax, and should they be treated as very long idioms? 
Semantic analyses 
We argue that in almost all cases, concatenated calls each contribute their meaning 
independently from the others, with the result that a sequence is interpreted as the 
conjunction of its calls ([5][32]); furthermore, no dialectal variation in call meaning is 
needed.  But a key ingredient, justified in three case studies ([5]), is that the interpretation of 
a call or call sequence can be pragmatically enriched by competition with others (see Box 1). 
Notably, calls are subject to a version of the Informativity Principle mentioned above: if a 
call C2 is more informative than a call C1, then whenever possible C2 should be preferred to 
C1. Thus if a raptor shows up, and a raptor call is available, then it should be preferred over 
an unspecific call; for this reason, the unspecific call may end up signifying the absence of a 
raptor.  
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 Importantly, this Informativity Principle need not involve an ability to reconstruct 
conspecifics' intentions: its effects can be obtained as soon as a rule of competition among 
calls can take into account a relation of informativity. Still, the potential presence of an 
Informativity Principle in monkey languages and in human language raises interesting 
questions about their (joint or separate) evolutionary origin.  
Analyzing Campbell's meanings 
Let us now see how  the Informativity Principle can help analyze Campbell's calls (Figure 1a; 
Box 1; [23]). As a first step, we take krak to trigger unspecific alerts, and hok to trigger non-
ground alerts.  As a second step, to analyze the meaning of the suffix -oo, we assume that if R 
is krak or hok, R–oo indicates a weak alert of the R-type. Thus hok-oo indicates a weak (-oo) 
non-ground (hok) alert – which is more informative than hok. 
 It is in the third step that we make crucial use of the Informativity Principle: hok 
competes with other calls, and because hok-oo (pertaining to weak non-ground alerts rather 
than to any non-ground alert) is more specific, the meaning of hok is enriched to hok but not 
hok-oo: it only applies to aerial (hok) non-weak (not hok-oo) alerts – hence the raptor uses. 
By the same logic, the unspecific alert krak competes with krak-oo, but also with hok. Due to 
this competition with two more informative calls, in the end krak can only be used for serious 
(not krak-oo) ground (not hok) disturbances. This comes very close to the leopard uses 
observed in Tai.  
 The last step is to account for the different use of krak on Tiwai island, where it raises 
unspecific alerts. Strikingly, this use just corresponds to the basic (unenriched) meaning of 
krak. The question is why this bare meaning fails to be pragmatically enriched on Tiwai. A 
plausible answer is that this would yield a useless meaning due to the absence of serious 
ground predators. Without the pragmatic enrichment, we are left with the literal and general 
meaning of krak on Tiwai island. 
Analyzing Putty-nosed meanings 
Turning to Putty-nosed pyow-hack sequences, we may treat them as (non-compositional) 
idioms, memorized as whole units.  But this is unsatisfying because these sequences are slow 
and come in many varieties, depending on the number of repetitions. An alternative is to posit 
that these sequences have a weak literal meaning, but that it is pragmatically enriched by an 
Urgency Principle, which mandates that within a sentence, calls that convey information 
about the location of a threat come before those that don't (Figure 1b; [33]). Specifically, we 
take pyows to trigger unspecific alerts, and hacks to warn of (serious) non-ground, 
movement-related events. Semantically, then, a pyow-hack sequence warns of a non-ground, 
movement-related event, e.g. the impending movement of an attacking raptor, or of the 
(arboreal) monkeys themselves. But if a raptor were present, hacks would convey 
information about the location of the threat and hence (by the Urgency Principle) it should 
come before pyows. This explains why pyow-hack sequences are indicative of group 
movement; no idioms are posited, but competition principles are crucial (see [33] for a more 
detailed analysis).  The Urgency Principle is speculative at this point, but it is noteworthy that 
it might explain some constraints on alert calls found in other species, notably in birds 
([28][34][35]). 
Analyzing Titi meanings 
Let us now go back to the puzzle of Titi sequences. Due to their length and slow time course, 
it is unlikely that these sequences are interpreted as idioms. We explore a leaner analysis in 
which each call contributes its meaning independently from the others (Figure 1c; [36][37]). 
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Since the B-call is used in predatory and non-predatory situations alike, we take it to trigger 
an unspecific alert. In field experiments, the A-call triggers a looking up behavior, so we 
posit that it is indicative of serious non-ground alerts. These assumptions explain why we 
find B+-sequences (i.e. a series of B-calls) in cat on the ground situations, and A+-sequences 
(i.e. a series of A-calls) in raptor in the canopy situations.  
 But why do we find A+B+ (i.e. a series of A-calls followed by a series of B-calls) in 
raptor on the ground situations? A remark about hunting techniques proves essential: raptors 
on the ground probably attack by flying, hence the serious non-ground alerts A+. Still, being 
on the ground isn't a typical hunting position, and after a while the alert stops being serious, 
which only leaves B as a possibility. In cat in the canopy situations, we find AB+ sequences 
(i.e. an A-call followed by a series of B-calls), possibly because a serious non-ground danger 
is indicated, which then transitions to a weaker danger because a cat becomes less dangerous 
after detection ([1]). 
 If this analysis is on the right track, the apparent complexity of Titi sequences reflects 
the interaction between simple meanings and the evolution of the contextual environment as 
the sequence is produced, rather than a complex syntax/semantics interaction or very long 
idioms. 
 As can be seen, a unifying theme of these various studies is the division of 
informational labor between semantics, pragmatics and the environmental context – which in 
the cases discussed makes it possible to maintain particularly simple individual meanings and 
composition rules.  
Reconstructing the evolutionary history of calls 
While the comparative analysis of monkey calls brings out some common theoretical themes, 
it also highlights numerous shared properties at the level of call form and function. In fact, 
comparative studies of monkey calls have long been used to reconstruct phylogenies (i.e. the 
'family trees' of monkey species), with results that often converge with DNA methods 
([38][39]). But one can turn the problem on its head and start from established phylogenies to 
reconstruct call evolution. This promises to offer a window into the evolution of form and 
meaning in simple communication systems. 
 Initial results are striking.  Booms are non-predation-related calls present in many 
subspecies of cercopithecines, including Campbell's and Putty-nosed monkeys (Figure 2). 
Inspection of their distribution is strongly indicative of their presence in the most recent 
common ancestor of entire subgroups: booms probably existed several million years ago 
([5][40]).  Thus while comparative monkey semantics might not directly illuminate the 
evolution of human language,  it could yield striking insights into the evolution of meaning in 
simpler systems. 
Concluding remarks and future perspectives 
We take this discussion to suggest that general questions and tools from formal linguistics 
can prove fruitful in the analysis of the form and especially meaning of monkey calls. This 
program could be extended to other systems of animal communication as well. For instance, 
bird calls/songs have been argued to display interesting phonological ([41][42]), syntactic 
([19][43]) and semantic ([34][35]) properties, and we mentioned in our discussion of the 
Urgency Principle that they might be studied from a pragmatic perspective as well. In 
addition, it has been argued that birds can learn morphological patterns of affixation 
(involving prefixes and suffixes) in artificial languages ([44]). 
 We also argued that the adoption of a comparative perspective can yield new insights 
into the evolution of calls over millions of years. And in the long term, a detailed 
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understanding of monkey calls is certainly a pre-condition to a meaningful comparison with 
human language (see Box 2). 
 Each sub-area leads to new questions that should help orient future research, as 
outlined in the Outstanding questions box. One key issue is whether the division of labor we 
proposed between semantics, pragmatics and the environmental context is on the right track. 
In particular, we posited rules of pragmatic competition that enrich the meaning of some calls 
whose core informational content is by itself compatible with a broad range of situations. An 
alternative is to take these calls to provide specific instructions about precise actions, which 
might be appropriate for a broad range of situations (such as looking around; [45][28]). 
Further experimental studies should help distinguish among these proposals.   
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 Figure 1. Data and possible theories for three monkey species: Campbell's monkeys, Putty-
nosed monkeys, and Titi monkeys 
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Box 1. How does one argue for a semantic analysis? 
 
It is sometimes thought that postulating meanings in monkeys is necessarily ad hoc because the 
subjects cannot be asked what they have in mind when they produce a call. This objection is based on 
several misconceptions. 
• First, even in human linguistics one can't just ask subjects what the meaning of a word is: while they 
have intuitions about the truth conditions of sentences, the meaning of a word is a theoretical 
construct that must be supported by indirect evidence. A case in point is the word or, discussed in the 
text: speakers have no reliable intuitions as to whether the meaning they have in mind is inclusive or 
exclusive. Rather, it is by investigating the truth conditions of numerous sentences that linguists 
concluded that or is inclusive, and that its exclusive use is derived by the Informativity Principle. 
Similarly, primate semantics starts from the analysis of truth conditions; the main difference is that 
information about these is much harder to obtain than in adult humans. A closer point of comparison 
pertains to meaning in children, where experimental methods are needed to elicit truth conditions 
([46]). 
• Second, as in every scientific endeavor there are two main criteria of success for a theory: its 
parsimony; and its ability to make correct predictions ([28][45]). To be concrete, consider the case of 
Campbell's krak (Box 1a), and compare two theories: 
(i) krak has a ground threat meaning in the Tai forest, but a meaning of general alert on Tiwai island 
(Dialectal Variation Theory);  
(ii) krak has a general alert meaning on both sites, but is enriched by the Informativity Principle when 
this does not yield a useless meaning (Uniform Theory).  
–If independent motivation for the Informativity Principle can be found, the Uniform Theory can be 
taken to be more parsimonious.  
–More importantly, the Uniform Theory makes correct predictions that are not made by the Dialectal 
Variation Theory. To give but one example, the Uniform Theory explains why krak-oo, which has a 
general meaning on both sites, can be derived from krak + -oo, in particular on the view that R-oo 
signals a weak alert of the R-type. The Dialectal Variation Theory has difficulty with the data from 
Tai: since hok signals non-ground threats and hok-oo weak non-ground threats, and since (according 
to that theory) krak signals ground threats, one would expect that krak-oo signals weak ground threats 
– which is incorrect: even in Tai, krak-oo has non-ground uses. 
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Box 2. What is the relation between monkey languages and human language? 
 
We argue in the text that the methods of formal linguistics can prove useful in the investigation of 
monkey languages, but that it does not follow that the latter share non-trivial properties with human 
language. There are important dissimilarities and some limited similarities between the two systems 
([5][28][47][48]).  
• Morphology and syntax: word-internal and sentence-internal structure is extremely limited in the 
species we have studied (but see [21]): calls are limited to two components (e.g. krak+-oo), and there 
is no evidence that sequences have a complex structure. By contrast, human language has arbitrarily 
complex words (e.g. anti-dis-establish-ment-ari-an-ism), and highly sophisticated syntactic structures 
([6][7][48]). Furthermore, monkey languages display numerous cases of call repetition, which have 
no equivalent in human language.  
• Semantics: unlike most human words, call meanings that have been posited so far usually pertain to 
threats, although this is partly due to a selection bias (for female social calls, see [24][25]).  Call-
internal composition seems to exist in Campbell's monkeys (krak-oo) and possibly beyond, but 
remains limited ([28][32]). There is no real evidence of non-trivial composition of meaning sequence-
internally, as each call can be taken as an individual sentence, interpreted independently from the 
others.  
• Pragmatics: while there is no clear evidence for an ability to represent communicative intentions in 
monkeys, we postulated in the text an Informativity Principle that is similar in form to one found in 
human language, but their evolutionary relationship is unclear. 
  
When monkey languages are better understood, one would need to ask whether any similarities they 
bear to human language arose by convergent evolution (in case similar properties developed 
independently in humans and in monkeys)  or could result from evolution from common descent (in 
case similar properties are inherited from the communicative system of the most recent common 
ancestor of monkeys and humans). 
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Figure 2. Call evolution: the example of boom 
C.	mi&s	albotorquatus			
C.	mi&s	boutourlinii			
C.	mi&s	monoides			
C.	mi&s	albogularis		
C.	mi&s	erythrarchus			
C.	mi&s	labiatus			
C.	mi&s	monoleyi			
C.	mi&s	stuhlmanni		
C.	mi&s	dogge7			
C.	mi&s	kand&			
C.	mi&s	kolbi			
C.	mi&s	heymansi			
C.	mi&s	francescae			
C.	nic&tans	mar&ni			
C.	nic&tans	nic&tans		
C.	mi&s	mi&s			
C.	mi&s	opisthos&cus			
C.	ascanius	whitesidei			
C.	ascanius	ascanius			
C.	ascanius	katangae			
C.	ascanius	schmid2			
C.	cephus	cephus			
C.	cephus	ngo5oensis		
C.	erythro2s	erythro2s		
C.	erythro2s	camerunensis			
C.	petaurista	petaurista			
C.	petaurista	bue9koferi		
C.	erythrogaster	pococki			
C.	preussi	preussi			
C.	preussi	insularis		
C.	lhoes2	lhoes2			
E.	Patas		
C.	pogonias	wolﬁ			
C.	pogonias	elegans			
C.	pogonias	pyrogaster			
C.	pogonias	den&			
C.	pogonias	schwarzianus			
C.	pogonias	grayi			
C.	pogonias	nigripes			
C.	pogonias	pogonias			
C.	mona			
C.	campbelli			
C.	neglectus			
C.	roloway			
C.	diana			
Chl.	aethiops			
Chl.	tantalus			
Chl.	pygerythrus			
Chl.	cynosuros			
C.	dryas			
Chl.	Sabaeus		
C.	solatus			
C.	hamlyni			
A.	nigroviridis			
M.	talapoin	*			
M.	ogouensis	*			
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																																																																				Time	in	Myr	  
 Phylogenetic tree of cercopithecines (from [40] and [5]), with boldfaced names in blue for species 
that have booms.  It seems very likely that the most common recent ancestor of the top blue (= mitis) 
group (which lived about 2.5 million years ago) had booms, since all of its descendants do; and 
similarly for the most recent common ancestor of the middle blue group (C. pogonias, C. mona, C. 
campbelli, C. neglectus). 
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Trends 
• Data gathered in field experiments provide detailed information about the form and function 
of monkey calls, especially the situations that trigger them and the information that 
conspecifics derive from them.  
• While monkey calls radically differ from human language, their form and meaning can be 
illuminated using general tools from formal linguistics (morphology, syntax, semantics). 
• Meaning studies should explain how monkey calls can encode information, thanks in 
particular to three components: the literal meaning of calls, knowledge of the environmental 
context, and some rules of competition among calls according to which more informative 
calls are normally preferred to less specific ones. 
• Evolutionary connections between monkey calls and human language are unclear, but 
within monkey species the evolutionary history of calls can sometimes be traced over 
millions of years. 
 
Outstanding Questions 
 
• Phonology: The sound system of monkey calls should be investigated for itself, but also to 
determine whether some syntactic constraints are reducible to properties of the 
articulatory/perceptual system. 
• Morphology: Beyond Campbell's and Diana monkeys, can further cases of call-internal 
structure be found? 
• Syntax: Can monkey syntax be analyzed by way of 'finite-state' languages, and if so which 
subclass of these is appropriate? Is there evidence for a level of sentence structure beyond the 
concatenation of individual calls? 
• Lexical semantics: What constraints are there on possible call meanings? Which of these 
constraints come from limitations of monkey conceptual abilities? Do calls provide 
information about the environment, or about actions to be taken, as is standard in game-
theoretic studies of meaning? 
• Combinatorial semantics: Can all call sequences be analyzed with a minimal rule of 
combination, with each call contributing its meaning independently from the others? If not, 
what happens when syntactically complex expressions are interpreted: is their meaning 
compositional or non-compositional? 
• Competition-based pragmatics: Can direct evidence be provided for principles of 
competition among calls, such as the Informativity and Urgency Principles? Should one re-
analyze unspecific alert calls as having instead specific meanings about actions, e.g. 'look up' 
(if a threat comes from above)  and 'look around' (if the threat is unspecified or comes from 
below)? 
• Intentional pragmatics: How much does primate pragmatics involve a theory of mind? In 
particular, are there audience effects  whereby monkeys adapt their calls to the perceived 
belief state of their audience? 
• Evolution:  Can the evolution of further calls (such as cercopithecine booms) be traced over 
millions of years? Can formal analyses of meaning evolution (especially within evolutionary 
game theory) explain the contemporary use and/or the evolutionary emergence of some call 
systems? 
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Glossary 
 
Combinatorial semantics: field of semantics concerned with the literal meaning of complex 
expressions in language – and by extension the object of study of this field. 
Convergent evolution: the independent evolution in two species of a feature that was not 
present in their most recent common ancestor. 
Evolution by common descent: the existence in two species of a feature that they inherited 
from their most recent common ancestor. 
Evolutionary game theory: branch of game theory concerned with the ways in which some 
strategies come to dominate others in social change or in biological evolution. 
Informativity Principle: pragmatic principle that specifies that if a certain expression 
evokes a more informative one, the speaker can utter the less informative expression only if 
he is not in a position to utter the more informative one, usually because it is false.    
Lexical semantics: field of semantics concerned with the literal meaning of elementary 
expressions in language – and by extension the object of study of this field. 
Morphology: field of linguistics concerned with the internal structure of words in language –
 and by extension the object of study of this field. 
Phonology:  field of linguistics concerned with the organization of sounds in language – and 
by extension the object of study of this field. 
Phylogeny: evolutionary relationships among various species. A phylogenetic tree represents 
these relationships by way of a tree-like diagrams (as in Figure 2) in which the descendants 
of a given species appear under it in the tree (or to its right, as in Figure 2). 
Pragmatics:  field of linguistics concerned with the various ways in which the literal 
meaning of an expression can be enriched by reasoning on the speaker's reasons for choosing 
it over alternative expressions; by extension, the object of study of this field. 
Finite-state languages:  formal languages that can be recognized by finite state machines, 
which just  contain a list of states and a specification of which state to go to when reading a 
given word. This model was shown in the 1950's to be insufficiently rich to handle human 
languages. 
Semantics: field of linguistics concerned with the literal meaning of expressions in language; 
by extension, the object of study of this field. 
Syntax: field of linguistics concerned with the structure of sentences in language, in 
particular with the rules according to which words are put together to form sentences (in a 
broad sense, syntax is concerned with all constraints on the form of sentences); by extension, 
the object of study of this field. 
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